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PETITION OF RESPONDENTS-DEFENDANTS FOR REHEARING 
COME NOW respondents-defendants and petition this 
:ionorable court for rehearing of this appeal from judgment of 
,~,e Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, 
Judge. This petition is based upon the following points of error 
in the ruling by the majority of the court in its written opinion 
filed May 5, 1978: 
POINT I. THE OPINION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT ON 
ISSUE OF STANDING DIRECTLY CONTRAVENES THE RULES PROMULGATED 
AND THE LAW AS DECREED BY THE COURT IN THAT IT CONTRADICTS 
THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF RULE 56(e) AND TURNS UPON REPRESEN-
TATIONS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
POINT II. BASED UPON THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE BEFORE 
THE COURT APPELLANT CANNOT TRACE THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT 
BACK TO A COMMON GRANTOR AND THEREFORE APPELLANT HAS NO 
ST.ll.NDING TO ENFORCE SUCH A COVENANT. 
POINT III. EVEN ASSUMING SATISFACTION OF THE DOCTRINF 
OF HAYES V. GIBBS APPELLANT WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE BENEFITTED 
BY THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT AND THEREFORE LACKS STANDING TO 
ENFORCE IT. 
POINT IV. COUNSEL REQUESTS CLJ>.RIFICATION AS TO WHETHER 
ON REMAND SUMKl\.RY JUDGMENT WOULD BE AVAILABLE IF ADDITIONAL 
UNDISPUTED FACTS DEMONSTRATED THAT APPELLANT LACKS STANDING 
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF HAYES V. GIBBS. 
Dated this 25th da7 of .May, 1978. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action alleging violation of a restrictive 
co·;enant applicable to real property and seeking alternatively 
injunctive relief and damages. 
DISPOSITION OF APPEAL FOLLOWING PRIOR HEARING 
This appeal was taken from a decision of the Third Judicial 
Di.strict Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Dean E. Conder 
presiding, granting defendants-respondents' motion for summary 
judgment on the separate grounds that ( 1) plaintiff-appellant lacks 
standing to sue for the enforcement of the subject restrictive 
~~nant, and (2) plaintiff-appellant is barred from suing to 
enforce the subject restrictive covenants by the doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel. 
The appeal was argued orally to this honorable court on 
April 12, 19-8. On ~lay 5, 1978 the court filed a written opinion, 
per Justice Hall and concurred in by Justices Crockett and Maughan, 
(a copy of which is attached hereto) reversing the decision of the 
~ial court and remanding the case for further proceedings not 
~consistent with the opinion of the court. Chief Justice Ellett 
wrote a dissenting opinion which was concurred in by Justice Wilkins. 
It is with respect to the court's ruling on the issue of 
swnding to which defendants-respondents seek rehearing before the 
court for the reasons stated herein. 
-1-
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POINT I 
THE OPINION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT ON THE IS , . 
STANDING DIRECTLY CONTRAVENES THE RULES PROMULGATE~UE ~'­
LAW AS DECREED BY THE COURT IN THAT IT CONTRADICTS ~ANu-· 
LANGUAGE OF RULE 5 6 ( e) AND TURNS UPON REPRESENTATIO~;~E c· 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. ~'.I•:: 
The opinion of the majority on the issue of 
standir:: 
based upon the summary judgment requirements of Rule 56, Utat: 
of Civil Procedure, declaring that there remains as tot~~ 
".•· 
of standing an issue of material fact which precludes S\JJlUl\ari· 
judgment determination. However, in so ruling the majority d:: 
contradicts Rule 56 and relies upon oral and written represe:.-
tations made by counsel for appellant which are totally wit::::· 
support in the entire record, and certainly devoid of t~ ~~ 
support expressly required by Rule 56 (e). Without such rellr 
and therefore because of the error of such reliance, the op1:.:· 
the majority cannot stand. 
This issue of standing as briefed and argued to t:.E 
by both parties is governed by the case of Hayes v. Gibbs, i: 
U.54, 169 P.2d 781 (1946). Basically, this case requires tr.r 
one to have standing to enforce a restrictive covenant whic: 
part of general scheme for building and development, one mus: 
able to trace the covenant back to a common grantor. 16 9 p : 
783-786. This interpretation of Hayes v. Gibbs is adopted: 
majority opinion (Opinion p. 2). consequently the issue o: 
the restric:. ing turns upon whether the appellant can trace 
k t a com.mo:. covenant encumbering respondents' property bac 0 
-2-
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In reference to this issue, the majority opinion makes 
several determinative declarations. In its recitation of the 
"basic facts presented" the majority states: 
"[T)he litigants are the owners of adjacent lots in 
Northcrest Subdivision which share a common boundary, although 
one lot is in Plat "E" and the other in Plat "F" of said 
subdivision; the two plats were developed by separate corp-
orate entities hence the lots in question were ostensibly not 
acquired from a common granter, however [Appellant] maintains 
that both corporations were wholly owned by one James B. 
cunninghaJn; the lots in both plats aresubject to the same 
restrictive covenants as to structure height, they merely 
having been imposed by different developers; " (emphasis 
added). (Opinion p. l). 
The majority then concludes that as to this issue of 
whether there is a common granter there remains a question of fact, 
stating: 
"The issue of standing raised in the pleadings is one of 
material fact which precludes that the---eritry of summary 
judgment ... 
[Appellant) contends he and [Respondents] did derive 
their titles from ~ common granter since the corporate 
developers were in fact one and the same." (emphasis added). (Opinion p. 2):- - -- -- -- --
These pivotal contentions by appellant emphasized above 
~d relied upon by the majority to create the swnmary judgment 
defeating "issue of material fact" are not the product of the 
record, but rather are entirely founded upon written and oral 
representations of appellant's counsel on appeal. 
The primary purpose of the summary judgment procedure as 
stated by this court in Dupler v. Yeates, 10 U.2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 
:l 96 0) "is to pierce the allegations of the pleadings, show that 
:".ere is no genuine issue of material fact, although an issue may 
-3-
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be raised in the pleadings, and that the moving part'' i 
.1 s e:::~:_ 
to judgment as a matter of law.'' 351 P.2d at 636 (emphasis J'.' 
Prior to the 1965 amendment to Rule 56 (e) there''" 
-.. 
question as to whether allegations in pleadings were alone s·.:' 
to create issues of fact when opposed by affidavits. See C:.r.· 
--...::.:..: 
v. Financial Service Co., 14 U.2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010 (19 631 . 
However, the 1965 amendment removed all doubt. Rule 56(e) :,o. 
requires a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to:::, 
forward with admissible evidence in the form of affidavit er 
deposition, or suffer the consequences. Rule 56 (e) now reaC:s. 
part: 
"When a motion for summary judgment is made and su:: 
as provided in this Rule, an adverse party may not rest·~ 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but r.1s 
response by affidavitsor as otherwISe provided in thu~ 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a,:: .. 
issue for trial. If he does not so respond, SUJ1U11ary-j~;c, 
if approprrate";° shall be -entered" against him. "("effiph~ 
added) . --- -
Any question of whether the vestiges of Christense: 
supra remained following the amendment was expressly disposes' 
this court in United American Life Insurance Company v. w:L' 
U.2d 279, 444 P.2d 755 (1968) wherein a party attemptedt0 "· 
upon Christensen contending that mere allegations were suffi:. 
The court met such a contention with the following reply: 
. t 13·· I 
"When that case [Christensen] was decided, 1 P· :'. 
all by itself among the states of the Nation, and tn~ '.::: 
associate it had in that regard was the Third Fe~er~ ,:: 
(Citation omitted) Quite aside frora having the ais;1:; 
causing Utah to be the only soldier in the :1at1on t",:· 
step " the case is now no authority :'or t::ie clai:n ;:~-: 
appellants for the reason that Rule 56 (e) ·t1as 3me~,~= 0 • 
-4-
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i-,, the addition of the following language 
~hen quotes Rules 56 (e). 
(the court 
The majority's assertion that the issue of standing~ 
~ in the pleadings is one of material fact which precludes the 
e~.trv of summary judgment not only abrogates the 1965 amendment to 
:<ule 56 (e), but also relegates Utah to become once again "the only 
~ldier i~ the nation to be in step." Additionally, the reliance 
J~n gratuitous and totally unsupported statements by counsel to 
the effect that the two corporate developers were both wholly owned 
by )Ir. Cunningham and were one in the same directly contravenes 
~le 56(e). If appellant has any shread of evidence to support 
these claims the time to come forward has long since passed. To 
allow such unsupported assertions to form the basis of the majority's 
remand of this case to the trial court makes a shambles of the 
letter and spirit of Rule 56 (e) and the remand should not be allowed 
to stand. 
POINT II 
BASED UPON THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT APPELLANT 
CANNOT TR.~CE THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT BACK TO A COMMON GRANTOR 
~~D THEREFORE APPELLANT HAS NO STANDING TO ENFORCE SUCH A 
COVENANT. 
As acknowledged by the majority opinion, the doctrine of 
Ha:ies v. Gibbs, supra, requires that appellant be able to trace the 
~strictive covenant which he is seeking to enforce back to a 
:ommor: gr an tor. ropinion p.2). Also as stated by the majority 
:;~~nion there is os':ensibly no common grantor, appellant having 
~c=u~red h:"' l ·Y': irJm 'lorthcrest ~1anor and respondents having 
-5-
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acquired their lot from Northcrest Investment. The only e'/;' 
before the lower court on this issue, and therefore before : . 
court, consists of testimony by one James B. Cunningham,. 
wn .. c-
contained within two affidavits; one in support of the mot::· 
summary judgment and one in opposition thereto. These af:::: 
state in their entirety as follows: 
"JAMES B. CUNNINGHAM, under oath, hereby deposes :~ 
states: 
1. . I am the president of the Northcrest Investme:: 
Corporation, the developer of Plat "F" of the Northcw: 
Subdivision. I have been president of this corporati:r. 1 
the date of its incorporation. 
2. That neither the Northcrest Investment Corpor::. 
nor myselrPersonally participated and/or owned an inte:; 
the development of Plat "E" of the NorthcrestSubdi~ 
3. When Northcrest Investment Corporation acquire: 
prr_ipertv Idei1tified as Northcrest Subdivision, Plat'"f":i 
was no restrictive covenant encumbering the property~~ 
4. !_ made the attached restrictive covenants~ 
to the lots in Plat "F" Northcrest Subdivision, togeb:' 
the buyers of such lots, by recording the same in the:': 
of the Salt Lake County Recorder on or about August 21, · 
5. The primary purpose and intent of the height r:: 
tions contained within the attached covenant is to ~race' 
view of the Salt Lake Valley for those lots in Plat 'T' ·1 
• • II i 
uphill side of property subject to the restr1ct1ons. ' 
added). 
"JAMES B. CUNNINGHAM, under oath hereby deposes::: 
states: 
1. Phenix Investment Inc. purchased all of th~ f;-j 
Northcrest Manor Inc., ~ had developed Pla\ ~ ~ Q 
Subdivision, and then dissolved the Northcrest ~"'" 
and brought all of its land into Phenix Investme~ --+:. 
land investment company, which then transferred ~:;:;; 
Northcrest Investment Co. ---ofWhich I am President. 
- ------
2. It was through Northcrest Investment co. 
continued development of Northcrest Subd1v1sion 
-6-
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purchased the stock of Northcrest Manor, I continued the 
development of the area maintaining the same name for the 
~ubdivision and filing restrictive covenants like those filed 
~or the portion of the Subdivision already developed." (emphasis 
added). 
It is admitted that appellant's lot is in Plat "E" which 
~s developed by Northcrest Manor and that respondent's lot is in 
Plat "F" which was developed by Northcrest Investment. Thus, once 
again, the critical issue before the court is whether Northcrest 
Manor, Inc. and Northcrest Investment were one and the same corpora-
tion wholly owned by James Cunningham. The only evidence before 
:he court is that neither Mr. Cunningham nor Northcrest Investment 
corporation participated in and/or owned any interest in the devel-
O?ment of Plat "E", and therefore no interest in Northcrest Manor 
at the critical point in time when Plat "E" was developed. 
Following acquisition by Phenix Investment, Inc. of the 
Northcrest Manor stock and the immediate dissolution of Northcrest 
Hanor (which made the purchase of the stock of Northcrest Manor 
tantamount to the outright purchase of the assets of Northcrest 
:1anor) the land in Plat "F" was ultimately deeded to Northcrest 
Investment. This letter of conveyance of Plat "F" was not encumbered 
by any restrictive covenant, thereby making impossible any chain of 
covenant back to Northcrest Manor. 
Under these undisputed facts there is no manner or means 
by Which appellant can argue that the test of Hayes v. Gibbs has 
~en met. All interest and ownership in Plat "F" was circuitously 
~ransferred from ;Jorthcrest Manor to Northcrest Investment without 
- "
2 ncun1br,,r>:ci0 rf restrictive covenant. This break in the chain 
-- "''c re t-t1e •..;,l_· granter common to both appellant and 
-7-
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respondent, i.e. Northcrest Manor, breaks the enforc b . 
ea ilit1:. 
covenant and thereby deprives appellant of any standing~~ 
the covenant. 
part: 
POINT III 
EVEN ASSUMING SATISFACTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF HAYES V .. 
APPELLANT WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE BENEFITTED BY THE RES~;:'. 
COVENANT AND THEREFORE LACKS STANDING TO ENFORCE IT .... 
The restrictive covenant in question provides in r:: 
"THAT, WHEREAS, NORTHCREST INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
the ~ of Northcrest Subdivision, Plat "F", situate~. 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and it desires and inte::1 
sell and convey th~ same to purchas~rs for the purposes :,1 con temp lated, and in order to restrict the use of said :::t 
and thereby enhance the value thereof, it hereby agrees.•. 
all who shall purchase said property, orany part ther:o: 
that in consideration orsilch purchase and use thereof,, 
property shall be and is restricted in the following res:'' 
to wit; 
USE OF LAND: Each lot in said subdivision is heret, 
designated as a residential lot, and none of the said::: 
shall be improved, used or occupied for other than priva: 
single family residence and no structure shall be er~~ 
placed on any of said lots other than a one, two or th:o:: 
garage not exceeding one story in height, and one single 
family dwelling not to exceed one story in height; exce:: 
that on those lots where the finished ground elevatior, :: 
least one story lower on one side of the dwelling than c:I 
opposite side, the dwelling may extend two stories ab01·e: 
finished ground elevation on such lower surface . · · anc: 
owner or owners of any of the lots in said subdivisio~,'::1 
have the right to sue for and obtain an injunction pru .... 
or mandatory to prevent the breach of or to enfo~ce t~'.,'. 
servance of the restrictions above set forth · · · (e ... ,. 
added). 
· ' d · d testi· mony of James cu::J According to tne un ispute 
" ... 1 
he, on behalf of Nor there st Investment, made this covenanc ,,. 
to Plat "F" for the "primary purpose and intent" of presec:: 
view of the Salt Lake Valley "for those lots in ~ ~ :_:: · 
-8-
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uohill ~ of the property subject to the restriction." It is 
:...>---
ad;;:itted by the appellant that his lot is not in Plat "F" and that 
:us let is below, or on the downhill side, of respondents' lot. 
In construing the provisions of a restrictive covenant 
suc1' as the one quoted above it is important to keep two rules of 
~nstruction in mind. First, whether or not a restrictive covenant 
dpplies to iand is a matter of the intent on the part of the one 
who imposes the restrictions. See, e.g. Hayes v. Gibbs, 20 Am.Jur. 
2d, covenants, etc., Sec. 292; see also annotation in 89 A.L.R. at 
page 812. Secondly, in construing any ambiguous terms in a restric-
l 
:t tive covenant all doubts must be resolved in favor of the free and 
unrestricted use of the property. These two rules of construction 
'1 were combined by this court in Parrish v. Richards, 8 V. 2d 419, 3 3 6 
P.2d 122 (1959) wherein it was stated: 
"[I]n the construction of uncertain or ambiguous restric-
tions the courts will resolve all doubts in favor of the free 
and unrestricted use of property, and that it will have re-
course to every aid, rule, or canon of construction to ascer-
tain the intention of the parties." Id. at 336 P.2d 122. 
Applying these rules of construction it is apparent that 
appellant was not intended by the granter to be benefitted by the 
covenant. Clearly, the fact that appellant's lot is below respon-
~nts' makes the height restriction protecting the view of Salt 
Lake Valley inapplicable. As to the question of whether the enforce-
:nent provisions apply to all owners of lots in the Northcrest 
Subdivision or just to those in Plat "F" there appears some ambig-
'Ji':~· on t:ie face of the covenant. However, given the stated in-
:e'."l:iJr: cf the :;:-a.n':'Jr to benefit "those lots in Plat "F", and the 
-9-
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presumption favoring the 
again must conclude that 
free and unrestricted use of p 
roper: 
appellant was not intended to b , 
e ce~.: 
by this covenant and, therefore, that he has no standing, 
Importantly, with respect to both the intent of~ 
Cunningham and the restrictive covenant applicable to Plat,,, 
appellant failed at the trial court to create an issue of iac: 
The undisputed facts fully support the trial court's granting: 
summary judgment for lack of standing. 
POINT IV 
COUNSEL REQUESTS CLARIFICATION AS TO WHETHER ON REMAND:, 
JUDGMENT WOULD BE AVAILABLE IF ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED nc:.' 
DEMONSTRATED THAT APPELLANT LACKS STANDING UNDER THE CCC:; 
OF HAYES V. GIBBS. 
Counsel is somewhat at a loss as to how it should ::1 
with the following inquiry. The majority opinion reverses ac: 
remands due to remaining questions of fact relating to the~ 
v. Gibbs issue of standing. However, in so doing the majorit: 
states that this issue of standing itself "as raised in the:: 
ings is one of material fact which precludes the entry of sir:-
judgment." 
If this court rejects the positions set forth in ?c:: 
hereof respondents find themselves in a position of ~v~g~ 
tional undisputable facts regarding the Hayes v. Gibbs issue 
standing but facing a declaration that under no circumstance: 
the issue of standing be determined on summary judgment. Pe: 
this quandry depicts the rationale behind the amendment tc ' .. ' 
(e) (see Point I) but nevertheless leaves respondents -,,·i:', 
-10-
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ct of discovery and trial on the merits when under undisputed prospe 
facts appellant has no standing. 
counsel for respondent respectfully requests that the 
Nurt answer the question as to whether, given undisputed facts 
which would demonstrate appellant's lack of standing under the 
doctrine of Hayes v. Gibbs, summary judgment could be again granted 
by the lower court. 
Respectfully Submitted this 25th day of May, 1978. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of May, 1978, postage 
prepaid, I mailed a copy of the foregoing to Nann Novinski-Durando 
at 431 South 300 East, Suite 210, Sal~ ~ke City, Jta.;: 84111. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Fiero G. R uffinengo, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
-----00000-----
Robert F. and Nancy H. Miller, 
The Art Company, J. Blair Jones, 
John Does 1 through 20, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
HALL, Justice: 
No. 15348 
FILED 
May 5, 1978 
Geoffrey J, Butlet, 
I 
Plaintiff {hereinafter "R uffinengo 11 ) appeals from a summary jud~~ 
dismissing his suit to enjoin the construction of a house by defendants 
(hereinafter "Miller") alleged to be in violation of a restrictive covenat'. l 
prohibiting the construction of dwellings in excess of two stories. 
. f 
The basic facts presented to the trial court are as follows: the 
litigants are the owners of adjacent lots in Northcrest Subdivision whici 
share a common boundary, although one lot is in Plat "E" and the other 
in Plat "F" of said sub di vision; the two plats were developed by sepam 
corporate entities hence the lots in question were ostensibly not acquire' 
from a common granter, how ever, R uffinengo maintains that both corpo:l 
were wholly owned by one James B. Cunningham; the lots in both platsa: 
subject to the same restrictive covenants as to structure height, theym· 
having been imposed by different developers; the covenants specifically 
provide for enforcement by any "owner or owners of any of the lots ins<. 
subdivision; 11 prior to the filing of the instant case, :tvliller had successf'jc 
defended a nearly identical lawsuit brought by two other lot owners inthel< 
subdivision wherein it was determined that the dwelling was not in violi: 
of the covenants. 
Ji 
The trial court determined, as a matter of law, that Rufiinengo~i· 
no standing to maintain the action since his granter was not comrnonto 
and that he was further barred by the doctrine of collateral estop~els~ 
issue presented had already been determined in the prior proceeding." 
contends the trial court erred in so doing, and we agree. 
. 1 "f h l d' depositions, ~ Summary Judgment is proper on y i t e pea ings, .. , .. 
• . . . . llh tne •· : 
answers to 1nterrogator1es, and adm1ss1ons on file, together w , 
· l fa c r :ic' • if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any matena · .. 
l Ifthere:'· 
movina art is entitled to a ·udament as a matter of law. 10 r: 
6 \" .11 . ' Estates, · 1. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 5 (c); In re ,,1 iams ~. 
348 P. 2d 683 (1960). 
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. . e as to any material fact, summary judgment should be denied. Z 
;nuine is su 
The issue of standing raised in the pleadings is one of material 
. h recludes the entry of summary judgment. The covenant in 
ictwhic. pfound in the chain of title of all lots in the subdivision and 
cest1on J.S 
t to allow enforcement by any and all lot owners. crpor s 
Ruffinengo contends he and Miller did derive their titles from a 
grantor since the corporate developers were in fact one and the 1mmon 
It has long been established that if a general scheme for building 1me. . • 
rdevelopment is intended by the original grantor, subsequent grantees 
iay bring action against each other to enforce restrictive covenants, and 
b intent may be shown by the acts of the grantor and the attendant · ~cumstances. 3 It necessarily follows that R uffinengo should be afforded 
je opportunity to make such a showing by presenting his evidence. 
As to the matter of collateral estoppel, it is to be noted 
'1ffinengo was not a party nor in privity with a party in the prior suit 
!ainst Miller. Consequently, he cannot be bound by that proceeding. 
1\llateral estoppel is not a defense as against a litigant who was not 
"party to the action and judgment claimed to have created an estoppel. 4 
The proposition was clearly stated in Blonder-Tongue v. University 
flllinois Foundations as follows: 
Some litigants -- those who never appeared in a 
o:l 
prior action -- may not be collaterally estopped without 
litigating the issue. They never had a chance to present 
their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process 
prohibits estopping them despite one or more adjudications 
of the identical is sue which stand squarely against their 
position. 
1
: It is also to be noted that if the doctrine should be applied to these 
;ts that Ruffinengo would be denied his constitutional right to appeal 
)cause he was not a party to the prior suit • 
.. 
Miller's contention that if Ruffinengo is not estopped all oth~; lot 
}ners could also sue and that the burden of litigation and accompanying 
1
· et1s ld e wou 6 be enormous, has no real merit for he needed only resort 
ule 19 (a) to protect against such eventualities. The rule reads in 
as follows: . 
Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P. 2d 862 (1952). 
, Hayes, et al. v. Gibbs, et al., JlO Utah 54, 169 P. 2d 781 (1946), dting 
Qr~"· Campbell, 192 N. Y. 490, 85 N. E. 687 (1908). -
Jm~r:nen ''·. Sla 1ens, Utah, 546 P. 2d 601 (1976);· Halling v. Industrial t 4·;~, 1~''1_n ol Utah, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78 (1927) • 
. u::;u,:., 313. 91 S. Ct. 1434, 28 L. Ed.2d 788 (1971). 
1 ·-a Rules Civil Procedure. 
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• •• persons having a joint interest shall be 
made parties and be joined on the same side as 
plaintiffs or defendants. When a person who should 
join as a plaintiff refuses to do so, or his consent 
cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant or 
in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff. ' 
Miller's further contention that Ruffinengo was "in privit " 5 .• 
because he had an identical right to his neighbor's that was pre·y· u::,. 11ousl" 
adjudicated is not persuasive. This is so for two basic reasons: 1 
(1) It is not at all unforseeable that R uffinengo might 
reach a different result than did the other lot owners in 
the prior suit, simply because he may present a far 
different or convincing case. 
(Z) This court has a consistent policy of resolving 
doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in 
court on the merits of the controversy. 7 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsiste~t 
with this opinion. 
WE CONCUR: 
J. Allan Crockett, Justice 
Richard J. Maughan, Justice 
ELLETT, Chief Justice: (Concurring in part and dissenting) 
The question presented by this appeal is this: can -an owner of\.i:: 
adjoining land subject to restrictive covenants enforce ~ose restrictic~ 
The plaintiff owns land in Plat E which was owned and developec_. 
by Northcrest Manor, Inc.. Phenix Investment, Inc., another corpor•· 
f t fer-•d ce~ purchased the stock of Northcrest Manor and therea ter rans '" i: .. 
a 'ion ca;;:. land previously owned by Northcrest Manor, Inc. to a corpor '. 
bd. 'd d it as Northcrest Investment which d_eveloped the land and su l\T1 e .. 
"Northcrest Subdivision, Plat F." In connection with the developme~­
then owner filed a document in the office of the County Recorder of·· 
~w~h~1~·c~h::_s~o~f~a::!.r~a~s_m:!;;a::..:_te::..:,r~ia::.:,l~h~e:..:_r~e~t~o:_:.r~e~a~d~s~·~·~~~~~~~~~~~------
7. Carmen v. Slavens, supra, footnote 4. 
IC 
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KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS; 
TH.A..T, WHEREAS, NORTHCREST INVESTMENT 
CORPORATION, is the owner of Northcrest Subdivision, 
Plat "F", situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and 
it desires and intends to sell and convey the same to ' 
purchasers for the purposes herein contemplated, and in 
order to restrict the use of said property and theFeby 
enhance the value thereof, it hereby agrees with all who 
shall purchase said property, or any part thereof, that 
i;i consideration of such purchase and use thereof, said 
property shall be and is restricted in the following respects, 
to wit: 
USE OF LAND: Each lot in said subdivision is hereby 
designated as a residential lot, and none of the said lots 
shall be improved, used or occupied for other than private, 
single family residence purposes, and no flat or apartment 
house shall be erected thereon, and no structure shall be 
erected or placed on any of said lots other than a one, two 
or three car garage not exceeding one story in height, and 
one single family dwelling not to exceed one story in height; 
The plaintiff owns no land in Plat F but does own a lot in Plat E 
1hicn abuts against the defendants' land in Plat F. 
One James B. Cunningham made an affidavit which was filed with 
he trial court. 'l;:he contents thereof were not disputed. The affidavit is 
~follows: 
JAMES B. CUNNINGHAM, under oath, hereby deposes 
and states: 
1. I am the president of the Northcrest Investment 
Corporation,- the developer of Plat "F" of the Northcrest 
Subdivision. I have been president of this corporation 
since the date of its incorporation. 
2. That neither the Northcrest Investment Corporation 
nor myself personally participated and/or owned an interest 
in the development of Plat "E" of the Northcrest Subdivision. 
3. When Northcrest Investment Corporation acquired 
the property identified as Northcrest Subdivision, Plat "F" 
there was t · ti - · the no res nc ve covenant encumbering property. 
. 
4 
T m 0L:e the attached restrictive covenants applicable 
:~ '~"' kts '';-=ht "F" Northcrest Subdivision, together with 
· "' ~' · '°' 0 of s·1ch lots, by recordincr the same in the Office ~ 1 tr .. " Salt Lake County Recorder on"'or about August 21, 1967. 
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5. The primary purpose and intent of the height 
restrictions contained within the attached covenant is 
to protect the view of the Salt Lake valley for those 
lots in Plat "F" on the uphill side of property subject 
to the restrictions. [Emphasis added.] 
Whether or not a restrictive covenant applies to land is a matter 
of intent on the part of the one who imposes the restrictions. I In this 
case it is clear that when the restrictions were placed upon Plat F b 
Mr. Cunningham, the president of Northcrest Investment Corporat' y ion, 
he did so to protect the view of owners on the uphill side of the land in 
in that plat. -
It is to be noticed that plaintiff does· not claim that defendants' 
land is subjected to any restrictions otre r than those set out by Northcre;: 
Investment Corporation as above set forth. There is no claim that any 
prior restriction made by anyone other than Northcrest Investment, Inc. 
confers any right upon the plaintiff to object to the manner in which the 
defendants propose to build their home. At the time the restrictions wen 
made to apply to "Northcrest Subdivision, Plat F" the Northcrest Invesli! 
Corporation did not own any of the land in Plat E in which plaintiff's land; 
located. 
I concur in the holding that the plaintiff is not estopped from brin~ 
this suit because of any "collateral estoppel," but I dissent from theorde: 
remanding the case for trial. There are no disputed is sues of fact show: 
in this case and I think the trial court correctly ruled that the plaintillbai 
no right to maintain the suit. I would affirm that ruling and award costs 
to the respondent. 
WILKINS, Justice, concurs in the views expressed in the concurril; 
in part and dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Ellett. 
292 the annotationinS'·: 1. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants etc., Sec. ; see 
at page 812. 
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